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Abstract 
 
It has become widely assumed that the standard employment relationship (SER) 
is in irreversible decline in industrialised societies.  However, non-standard and 
precarious work relationships often complement the SER via labour market 
transitions, and are not displacing it as the focal point of labour market 
regulation.  The coordination and risk management functions of the SER 
continue to be relevant in market economies, and the SER is adjusting to new 
conditions.  The SER has a complex and evolving relationship to gender and to 
social stratification.  In the European context where the SER originated and 
achieved its clearest legal expression, institutional solutions to precariousness 
and inequality are being developed, the most innovative of which avoid simple 
deregulation in favour of integrated policy responses involving a range of 
complementary regulatory mechanisms.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The irreversible decline of stable and regular employment in industrialised 
societies is a stylised fact that has reached the status of a conventional wisdom.  
But conventional wisdom can be wrong.  The standard employment relationship 
(‘SER’) continues to be a core legal and economic institution of a market 
economy.  It may have mutated in response to the current globalised and 
financially-driven variant of capitalism, but it is not withering away.  
Nonstandard working patterns, even the more precarious, are often 
complementary to the SER (Schmid, 2010) and do not in general offer a viable 
alternative to it as a focal point for coordination in labour markets (Deakin, 
2013).   
 
There are significant cross-national variations in the incidence of the different 
types of non-standard work and in trends in their use over time. Precariousness, 
an often-cited consequence of many forms of non-standard work (Standing 
2011), is currently increasing (Stone and Arthurs, 2013). It is suggested that 
changing social norms, in particular associated with a new household division 
of labour, along with shifts in modes of production and the impact of 
globalisation on the regulatory capacity of the state (Arthurs, 1996), have led to 
labour market segmentation between workers with stable working relationships 
and those with non-standard and precarious arrangements. Segmentation is 
associated with inequality, and with it the marginalisation of social groups. The 
institution of the SER itself is now seen as a barrier to mobility, excluding 
groups from accessing better paid, more secure employment, and so 
exacerbating inequality (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002; Cahuc and Kramarz, 2004; 
Stone and Arthurs, 2013; Gunderson, 2013).  However, this view is ill-founded 
both empirically and from the point of view of policy design. 
 
The trend in nonstandard working, particularly as embodied in precarious forms 
of work, is comparatively recent and is not characteristic of all periods of 
industrial development (Deakin, 2014b).  It is due in part to institutional 
rigidities, associated with the SER, but also to conscious policy choices which 
have privileged casualisation, wage suppression and the fiscalisation of 
employment over the promotion of stable work and a living wage (Deakin, 
2013b, 2014a); Meardi, 2014; De Stefano, 2014).  These policies, which are 
often presented as ‘inevitable’ (Stone and Arthurs 2013: 5), are not the unique 
best response that individual countries can make to the competitive pressures of 
a globalised market environment, and they have not been universally pursued 
(Doogan, 2013).  Scaled up, they would imply a general race to the bottom, but 
as it is in the interests of at least some sovereign states, some of the time, to 
pool their resources to prevent such an outcome, there continues to be a role for 
transnational regulation in offsetting this effect (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1994). 
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To understand the likely future evolution of the SER requires a three-stage 
analysis.  The first step is to place the phenomenon of the SER in a historical 
and theoretical framework which can account for its distinct institutional logic 
within a market economy.   Drawing on evolutionary models of the law-
economy relation (see Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005), we will argue (see section 
2 below) that the SER performs functions of coordination and risk allocation 
which have a central place in the organisation of capitalist labour markets.  At 
the same time the SER creates space for fairness norms to operate within the 
work relationship.  The SER reflects social practices but is also a normative 
point of reference in the construction of systems of labour market regulation 
through collective bargaining and labour law (Mückenberger, 1985, 1989; 
Bosch, 1986, 2004; Mückenberger and Deakin, 1989; Deakin and 
Mückenberger, 1992).   As such it mediates the relationship between labour and 
capital in the system of production, at the same time as altering the distribution 
of risks and incomes within society.  Thus the SER has a complex and evolving 
relationship to stratification along the lines of gender and social class.    
 
The second stage of our analysis consists of a review of the state of the art in 
empirical research on the SER and the extent of non-standard work (section 3).  
To what extent the SER is embodied in legal forms and how it is defined in 
comparison to precarious work is a consequence of country-specific regulatory 
strategies and legal categorisations which are embedded in national practices 
(Schmid, 2010).   The message coming from the data is that the core institution 
of the employment relationship is not being displaced by independent work.  
Trends in self employment are largely cyclical.  Within the broad category of 
dependent employment relationships, the relative weight of part-time work, 
fixed-term employment and temporary agency work varies considerably across 
national contexts.  The SER itself is changing: it is being reconfigured by 
changes in the incidence and character of female labour market participation 
and by changes in the gender-based division of household tasks (section 4). 
 
The third stage involves a consideration of the potential of the SER as a 
mechanism for addressing precariousness and inequality in labour markets 
(section 5).  Here we will review recent strategies of legal and institutional 
reform in European countries. We will argue that two strategies which have 
been widely adopted – seeking to extend the legal category of the SER to cover 
non-standard and precarious forms of work, on the one hand, and enacting a 
limited right to equal treatment between non-standard work and the SER, on the 
other, are restricted in what they can achieve.  The most successful and 
enduring policies are those which shift the focus of reform away from the 
deregulation of employment protection law to the use of a range of 
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complementary regulatory mechanisms, including collective bargaining, to 
normalise and protect nonstandard and precarious forms of work. 
 
Underlying the debate over the future of the SER is a deeper argument over 
whether the institutions of the social state, including labour law, can do 
anything more than mitigate the worst inequalities produced by the market, and 
may even exacerbate them. In the conclusion (section 6) we argue against this 
view, in favour of the proposition that the SER is evolving in ways which can 
counter some of the effects of workforce division and stratification: worker-
protective labour law continues, we maintain, to have the potential to realise a 
progressive policy agenda. 
 
In this context, our focus will be on the recent experience of the European 
systems.  While precariousness of work is a global phenomenon, its form can 
vary considerably. In North America, against a background of weak or non-
existent employment protection laws and dwindling union strength, the SER is 
only weakly embedded in legal and institutional practice (Stone, 2013a).  While 
high and rising earnings inequality, and the absence of an effective safety net in 
wage or social security, are characteristic of the US labour market, these trends 
are not as clearly reflected in or potentially exacerbated by the operation of the 
SER as they are in Europe.  In developing economies there is a great diversity 
of experience relating to ‘informality’ in labour markets, by no means all of 
which is consistent with the discourse of SER decline (Munck, 2013).  Middle 
income countries, in particular in Latin America, have seen a reversal of trends 
towards informalisation in the last decade, which is associated with a revival of 
collective bargaining and innovative use of basic income guarantees (Fraile, 
2009; Berg, 2011).  In China, the rise of a market economy since the 1980s has 
seen a decline in stable work forms associated with the state sector (Kuruvilla, 
Lee and Gallagher, 2013) but, coterminously with the recommodification of 
labour, a systematic attempt to construct the characteristic institutions of a 
labour market, including laws governing collective bargaining, social insurance 
and the individual employment contract (Cooney, Biddulph and Zhu, 2013).  
Whether these diverse experiences signify the long-term rise of the SER in 
countries currently undergoing industrialisation, of the kind which parallels the 
European experience of a century ago (Deakin, 2006), is perhaps too early to 
say.   Nonetheless, the experience of Europe, where the SER originated and 
reached its clearest expression in law and practice, remains a core case when 
considering the global trajectory of the SER and its long-run relationship to 
industrial capitalism. For these reasons, Europe will be the focus of the 
following sections.  
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2.  Origins of the SER: social function and juridical form 
 
Viewed empirically, the SER is a description of a set of linked practices 
associated with the organisation of work in its physical and temporal 
dimensions.  Thus the SER may be initially defined as work which is carried out 
on an integrated physical site, on a continuous or indeterminate basis, by 
reference to a standard unit of working time such as a complete working day or 
week.  The absence of one of more of these elements may make the work in 
varying degrees ‘atypical’ or ‘non-standard’.   Yet, there is clearly more to the 
SER than this: in the SER model, work is carried out within the framework of 
an exchange relationship, which presupposes the prior identification of property 
rights on either side.   Thus viewed analytically, the SER has economic and 
juridical dimensions.  It is an economic form in the sense that it describes work 
in a market setting, and a juridical one by virtue of the way in which it is 
structured as a relation between persons vested with the capacity to contract, a 
principal means by which the legal system underpins market-based exchange 
(Deakin and Supiot, 2009).  
 
More specifically, the SER describes a contract of a particular type, namely one 
in which the worker sells labour power, ‘abstract labour’, in return for wages.  
In that sense, it is a fundamental institution of a market or capitalist economy.  
It is inherent in this arrangement that the worker is placed at the employer’s 
disposal for a certain time and space, and that the employer retains property in 
the surplus thereby generated. This is not a natural arrangement: ‘labour power 
was not always a commodity’ (Marx, 1847).  For it to become one requires a 
legal-institutional structure of a certain kind. The ‘great transformation’ 
(Polanyi, 1944) that western society underwent to get to this point was only 
partially the result of the removal of ‘obstructions’ to the ‘free circulation of 
labour and stock’ (Smith [1776] 1999: 83).  It was accompanied from the 
beginning – prior to or contemporaneously with industrialisation – by the 
construction of institutions for the production and reproduction of the 
commodity that labour power was in the process of becoming (Deakin and 
Wilkinson, 2005). These included prototypical forms of social insurance and 
risk-sharing between workers and employers, which were underpinned from an 
early stage by the regulatory and fiscal powers of nation states (Lis and Soly, 
1979).  By the early decades of the twentieth century it was possible to argue 
that ‘the contract of employment even today… has become socialised and made 
secure by manifold social rights’ (Renner, [1929] 2010: 295).  Thus the SER 
became a site for social justice and not solely a mechanism of market 
coordination.   
 
There is no single story of the SER; its evolution has been shaped by country-
specific paths of industrialisation and political development throughout the 
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course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  The point at which it becomes 
possible to speak of a legal form known as the ‘contract of employment’, 
embodying features of the practice of the SER, is revealing.  This terminology 
is found in France (contrat du travail) and Germany (arbeitsvertrag) in the final 
decades of the nineteenth century, and in Britain in the early twentieth century 
(Cottereau, 2000, 2002; Mückenberger and Supiot, 2000; Simitis, 2000; Deakin, 
2001; Didry, 2002; Petit and Sauze, 2006).  Its appearance in juridical discourse 
was coterminous with wider developments in society. These included the rise of 
vertically integrated forms of industrial production, on the one hand, and the 
regularisation and legal acceptance of collective bargaining as a mode of self-
regulation and wage determination in industry, on the other.  Employers pressed 
for a form of wage labour that would give them direct control over the work 
process and enable them to appropriate the tacit knowledge of skilled workers 
(Jacoby, 1985; Biernacki, 1995). Industrial unions organised for direct 
employment to replace outsourced and casual labour (Wilkinson, 1977).  These 
two strategies were not exactly complementary – employers and unions were 
frequently in conflict over the form of work relationships in this period – but 
they both informed the stabilisation of the SER as a practice.   The legal system 
was called on to define the employment relationship for the purposes of social 
legislation which provided protection against workplace accidents and access to 
unemployment insurance and retirement pensions for wage-dependent workers 
(Deakin, 2001).   These measures formed part of the political programmes of 
working class parties and were either introduced by them or conceded by liberal 
and conservative governments, but in both cases were the indirect result of the 
extension of the democratic franchise and the opportunities it provided for 
political mobilisation (Wedderburn, 1980). 
 
In the process of incremental institutional change which gave rise to the modern 
welfare or ‘social’ state (Sozialstaat), juridical concepts underwent serial 
mutations and adaptations (Deakin, 2006).  In English law, the concept of 
‘service’ initially described a form of wage labour associated with an ordered 
hierarchy within the enterprise and the use of criminal sanctions to support the 
exercise of employer power.   At the point in the third quarter of the nineteenth 
century when criminal sanctions were removed and the first modern social 
legislation enacted, the very same juridical concept was used to determine the 
scope of laws protecting labour, in the form of workmen’s compensation 
legislation. The conjunction of disciplinary and protective functions is 
characteristic of the SER, as is the tendency to select from among categories of 
work relationships a subset of forms which particularly merit legal protection.    
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Thus in English judicial decisions of the early decades of the twentieth century, 
class was used as a signifier of the service contract, separating manual work 
from high-status occupations in management and public administration: when 
passing laws for worker protection, ‘the Legislature were contemplating a class 
of workers who may be described as belonging to the working class in the 
popular sense of that term: a wage earning class’ (Simpson v. Ebbw Vale Steel, 
Iron and Coal Co. (1905): see Deakin, 2001).  In the civil law systems of the 
European continent, it was common until the middle decades of the twentieth 
century to distinguish between wage earners by their manual or professional 
status, and to have a distinct legal regime for managerial cadres (Veneziani, 
1986; Deakin, 2006).   In all systems, social insurance laws were among the 
first to institute a single juridical status for all waged or salaried workers, as an 
aspect of their common integration into general systems of financing for 
unemployment compensation and retirement pensions (Mansfield, Salais and 
Whiteside, 1994).  In Britain, the division between the ‘dependent’ servant or 
employee, on the one hand, and the ‘independent’ or self-employed worker, on 
the other, did not clearly emerge until the passage of the National Insurance Act 
1946, which, consistently with the social insurance principle of ‘universality’ 
(Beveridge, 1942), brought ‘everyone inside… including those formerly above 
the income limit’ for social security contributions, as well as ‘those exposed to 
risk but who were outside insurance’ under the pre-war system (Potter and 
Stansfield, 1949: 18). 
 
As a legal construct, the SER was also gendered from an early stage, in the 
sense that the identification of a male ‘breadwinner’ presupposed a female ‘care 
giver’ (Vosko, 2010).  Thus even when social insurance law was dismantling 
legal classifications based on class, it formally disadvantaged women in their 
role as wage earners (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005).  In Britain, female-
dominated industrial trades were excluded from early accident compensation 
system regimes, at the same time as factory legislation barred women workers 
from more highly paid occupations on the supposed grounds of the risks posed 
by industrial processes to female reproductive capacity (Deakin, 1990).  When 
married women were included in social insurance systems, they generally paid 
higher contributions on the grounds that they represented a greater risk to the 
financing of schemes.  Mostly, however, married women were classed as 
‘secondary’ earners whose social security rights were derivative on their 
husbands’ contribution records.   Married women were treated as ‘a special 
insurance class of occupied persons’ because ‘the great majority of married 
women must be regarded as occupied in work which is vital though unpaid 
without which their husbands could not do their paid work’ (Beveridge, 1942: 
para. 107).   The founders of the welfare state were reacting against the poor 
law of the nineteenth century, in which women and men alike were required to 
seek out ‘independent’ work in markets characterised by the ‘chronic over 
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supply of casual labour in relation to the local demand’, and where the principle 
of less eligibility ensured ‘a demoralising irregularity of life’ for working class 
families (Webb and Webb, 1909: 193).   Replacing the workhouse with social 
insurance and a living wage underpinned by collective bargaining was a policy 
designed to ensure that ‘the labour market should always be a seller’s market 
rather than a buyer’s market’ (Beveridge, [1944] 1967: 18), but in the process 
female wage earners were channelled into part-time and intermittent work 
which ‘did not threaten to disrupt the patriarchal status quo in the household’ 
(Walby, 1986: 205). 
 
There has more recently been a legal de-gendering of the SER.  First enacted in 
the 1970s, sex discrimination laws gradually brought about the removal of laws 
barring women from certain categories of industrial employment (Deakin, 
1990).  Equal pay laws ensured that collective agreements could no longer set 
formally separate wage rates for women and men as they did in Britain until the 
early 1970s.   Married women’s derivative social security rights were gradually 
eroded away (Luckhaus, 1983).  These measures were premised on the belief 
that the security provided by the SER should be available equally to women and 
men.  Formal legal equality did not, however, ensure substantive parity of 
access to the SER. The loss of married women’s derivative social security 
rights, for example, was not compensated for by access to regular and 
continuous work of the kind needed to build up adequate pension entitlements 
(Sainsbury, 1996).  The application of the anti-discrimination principle did little 
to mitigate or remove the effects of occupational segregation in the workplace 
(Walby, 1988). 
 
In the course of the twentieth century, legal systems responded to the 
emergence of the social state by adapting the concepts of private law to new 
ends.   Karl Renner’s evolutionary Marxism argued that legal forms remained 
more or less constant even as their functions were being altered by social 
legislation (Renner [1929] 2010).  Juridical concepts were not as unchanging as 
Renner suggested.  The contract of employment which became ‘the principal 
institution of the social regulation of labour’ was not exactly the same as the one 
which during the nineteenth century had been ‘denounced as the source of all 
social suffering’ (Renner, [1929] 2010: 295).  Recent scholarship has shown 
that the Roman law concept of the locatio was maintained ‘in name only’ in the 
modern private law of the continental European systems (Veneziani, 1986), and 
that the division between the hire of services and the hire of completed work in 
the French and German civil codes served a different classificatory purpose to 
the later distinction between ‘subordinate’ and ‘independent’ work (Petit and 
Sauze, 2006).   Similarly, the English law variant of the contract of 
employment, while containing within it elements of earlier juridical forms 
including the disciplinary service model, was a response to the universalising 
8 
 
tendencies of social insurance legislation (Deakin, 1998), and characteristic of 
the period in the mid twentieth century when the ‘subordination of market price 
to social justice’ (Marshall, [1949] 1992: 40) was seen as a plausible goal of 
public policy.   The implication of these studies is that the modern concept of 
the contract of employment owes at least as much to the redistributive and 
egalitarian legislation of this period as it does to the classical private law of the 
nineteenth century.  The legal evolution of the contract of employment 
illustrates its dual functionality in a market economy: not only does it underpin 
the exercise of managerial prerogative in the workplace, it also serves as a 
mechanism for controlling and diffusing the risks associated with labour market 
participation, thereby mitigating, without ever entirely removing, the effects of 
wage dependency (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005).   
  
The SER, then, was a compromise, in which the employers obtained powers of 
coordination and control over workers in return for ceding to them a ‘guarantee 
of the basic conditions of existence’ (Supiot, 1999).  The legal institution of the 
contract of employment melded private law with the regulatory techniques of 
the social state.  The neoliberal critique of labour law which began to gain 
ground in the 1970s and came to fruition at the level of public policy and 
legislative change from the 1980s argued that this process was inherently 
contradictory.  F.A. Hayek’s claim that ‘specific commands (“interference”) in 
a catallaxy’ – a spontaneous market order – ‘create disorder and can never be 
just’ (Hayek, 1976: 128) unconsciously echoed the views of Soviet Marxist 
critics of the welfare state, who had argued that the forms of private law were 
incapable of being adjusted to address the failings of capitalism: in a market 
order, social justice is impossible since morality is ‘inferred from the exchange 
relationship and can have no significance beyond this’ (Pashukanis, [1927] 
2009: 161).    
 
The neoliberal programme calls for a return, through deregulation and de-
collectivisation, to the ‘private law society’ of the nineteenth century.  The 
concept of the private law society is in fact a mid twentieth-century invention 
associated with ordoliberal political thought (Böhm, 1966); in the formative 
years of industrial society, private law was flanked by interventionist 
mechanisms of various kinds, not least of which was the use of criminal 
sanctions to enforce labour market discipline (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005).  
But despite its empirical and analytical shortcomings, the neoliberal critique of 
labour law has spilled over into a more general consensus that thanks to 
globalisation and technological change, the SER is in a state of irremediable 
decline: ‘it is unlikely that these trends can be reversed any time soon or that we 
can reinstate the standard employment contract and the worker-friendly 
regulatory regimes that were built upon it’ (Stone and Arthurs, 2013: 5).  More 
than this, the SER itself is the cause of inequalities and rigidities in labour 
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markets.  The rise of non-standard and precarious employment has been driven 
by ‘the weight of regulations that are especially costly and may lack strategic fit 
in the new world of work’ (Gunderson, 2013).  Meanwhile, social stratification 
has returned with the emergence of a ‘precariat’ unable to access the 
occupational identity and social solidarity available to the dwindling class of 
wage and salary earners (Standing, 2011).  The supposed legal incoherence of 
the SER is, it is argued, reflected in its inability to function as a mechanism for 
social justice and market coordination. But, as we shall see, these claims are not 
clearly supported by evidence.     
 
3. The topography of non-standard work 
It is important to clarify exactly what we are referring to in the context of non-
standard work. It is not a homogeneous category. Non-SER working 
arrangements are diverse, and include part-time, fixed term, temporary agency, 
‘casual’, on-call, zero hours or self-employment, among others. These 
categories display a variety of characteristics, and they often overlap.  
Inconsistency in the use of terminology in the empirical literature makes it 
particularly difficult to form an accurate picture of both the extent of non-
standard work and its quality.  This is important because not all non-standard 
working should be equated with precariousness. There is much variation within 
and between categories such that some forms of non-standard work – some part 
time working and many fixed term contracts for example – are often virtually 
indistinguishable from the SER in terms of the stability and benefits they offer. 
However, non-standard work can be usefully defined as any working 
arrangement that lacks one or more of the key temporal or physical dimensions 
of the SER. To the extent that the SER provides access not just to income but to 
insurance against labour market risks, the emphasis on precariousness in the 
context of non-standard work is not misplaced.  Even the more regularised and 
stable forms of (female-dominated) part-time work offer less than complete 
protection against loss of income through unemployment and incapacity and 
have to be combined with reliance on a (typically male) partner’s ‘breadwinner’ 
wage (Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
It is true that long term employment and job stability in industrialised 
economies have declined since the 1970s, while non-standard working 
arrangements have increased to represent a significant and growing proportion 
of total employment (Stone, 2013b). However, this broad trend obscures 
variations within and between countries. The way the welfare state is organised 
is an important factor influencing male and female labour market participation 
rates and the nature of non-standard work (Esping-Andersen, 1999).  The male 
breadwinner ideology remains strongly entrenched in the earnings-related social 
insurance systems of corporatist or conservative welfare states of mainland 
Europe and in the family-orientated southern European states, in contrast to 
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social democratic systems, principally the Nordic states, which take active steps 
to promote female employment through universal childcare and a commitment 
to equal rights, and liberal market regimes such as the UK and Ireland in which 
gender roles are not so sharply delineated but governments are more passive in 
promoting women’s work.   Whether welfare states contribute to or alleviate the 
effects of dualisation in the labour market depends partly on the predominant 
form of benefits and transfers, according to the relative weight of ‘universalist’ 
versus ‘contributory’ and ‘selective’ elements, and on household structures and 
the nature of occupational stratification, as well as country-specific legal factors 
which may encourage the use of particular types of non-standard work 
(Häusermann and Schwander, 2012).   
 
Despite these wide differences, one common feature stands out: the SER 
remains the dominant form of the work relationship in European economies.  
Evidence of a return to forms of autonomous work of the kind which 
characterised labour markets in pre-capitalist or pre-welfare state societies is 
weak.  The share of self-employment in the UK has doubled since the 1960s 
and currently constitutes 15 per cent of the total labour force, while recent 
increases in Eastern Europe have also been pronounced.  However, across the 
EU as a whole there is no clear trend indicating an increase in self-employment, 
and some member states have seen declines.  Outside the southern states, self 
employment constitutes a small minority of the total labour force, and its 
incidence is correlated to fluctuations in the economic cycle (Vosko 2010).  
There are significant variations in country-specific definitions of independent 
work and the connotations it carries in different contexts.  Self-employment is 
not a homogeneous category: some legal and statistical classifications make a 
distinction between individualised self-employment, which is often hard to 
separate from waged work in the degree of economic dependence to which it 
gives rise, and self-employment in the form of a business through which capital 
assets are organised and other workers are employed (Burchell, Deakin and 
Honey, 1999). Much of the recent rise in self-employment in the UK signifies 
casual and intermittent work at rates of remuneration below those of waged 
workers, while a significant proportion of those who report self-employment as 
their main occupational status are also working as employees (Darcy and 
Gardiner 2014).  Thus it is not at all clear that independent or autonomous work 
is displacing the standard employment contract if that is defined as an 
arrangement under which labour power or the capacity to work is exchanged for 
a salary or wage.   
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A narrower definition of the SER, however, views it as a subset of the 
employment contract which refers to full-time, indeterminate work on an 
integrated physical or organisational site; from this perspective, non-standard 
working arrangements, such as part-time, fixed-term and temporary agency 
work, are mostly within the broad category of dependent employment, but 
represent a set of cases under which workers are to a greater or lesser extent 
detached from the social rights and protections which go with the SER.  As we 
show below, although non-standard work, defined in this way, has been 
increasing, this growth has occurred in ways which often complement standard 
employment, rather than substituting for it (Schmid, 2010; Eichhorst and Tobst, 
2014; Meardi, 2014).  We see this in two main ways. First, non-standard work 
often helps to bridge the gap between unemployment and standard employment, 
facilitating access to the SER rather than substituting for it. Second, we see a 
structural complementarity. This is evident to the extent that the marginalisation 
associated with non-standard work is often the product of strategies aimed to 
protect the SER. In addition, the SER continues to be the focal point of reform 
strategies that attempt to address the problems related to precariousness arising 
from non-standard work by ‘equalising’ standards of protection by reference to 
the SER (Deakin, 2013).   
 
 
3.1 Part-time work 
 
Part-time work is not always associated with precariousness. Nonetheless, part-
time work plays a role in reproducing gender segregation and marginalising 
those with household responsibilities which are hard to balance with full-time 
work.  
 
Part-time work was already present in most European labour markets in 1980, 
when it represented just over 16 per cent of employment across the EU.  By 
2007 it stood at 19 per cent in the EU 27, an increase but not a large one.  There 
is considerable cross-national variation in its incidence.  In many countries, the 
level of part time working has been consistently high, whereas elsewhere 
increases are more recent. In the Netherlands, part-time work represents around 
50 per cent of all employment, having increased by 18 per cent since 2000; in 
Italy, where the level is only 15 per cent, there has been an increase of 79 per 
cent increase from 2000 (Stone and Arthurs 2013).  
 
Although male part-time work has been increasing recently, on the whole part-
time work remains strongly associated with female labour market participation.  
It is widespread in the public sector and in occupations previously performed 
unpaid by women or by non-market forms of enterprise (Berckhout, van den 
Berg and Hof, 2009; Devine and Waters ,2008)).  There has also been an 
12 
 
increase in part-time self-employment for women in some countries.  Survey 
evidence indicates that self-employment and part-time work are a seen by 
women as a means of combining a career with having a family and children, 
particularly in conservative welfare regimes where traditional gender models 
are strong (Craig, Powell and Cortis, 2012).  However, there is a strong negative 
correlation between the incidence of full time self-employment and open-ended 
part-time work. This suggests that the rise in part-time working is not displacing 
the full-time SER (Schmid, 2010).  Considering gender and structural factors 
together, increases in part-time work can be attributed in several EU member 
states to women’s desire for economic independence, facilitated by state 
policies including changes to the tax-benefit system and the enactment of work-
life balance laws, and by the transformation of formerly unpaid work into 
market work (Schmid, 2010).  Given that transition rates between part-time and 
full-time work are relatively high, increases in part-time work do not necessarily 
indicate that the SER is becoming irrelevant, but rather than the SER is 
becoming more flexible to accommodate female participation in the labour 
market (Bosch, 2004).  
 
3.2 Temporary work 
 
Temporary work is a broad category that includes both fixed-term and agency 
work. However, the literature does not always make the distinction clearly. 
Consequently, it is difficult to discern whether the evidence refers to fixed term 
work only, or fixed term and agency combined. This is partly due to cross-
national variation in terminology. In our discussion of ‘temporary work’, we do 
not distinguish between direct temporary employment, and temporary 
employment through an agency.  We refer to ‘fixed term’ employment to cover 
temporary employment that does not take effect through an agency. We then 
deal with the specific situation of ‘agency work’ separately.  
 
Temporary work increased its share of overall paid employment in the EU from 
8.3 per cent to 14.7 per cent between 1987 and 2007, and represents 30 per cent 
of all new paid jobs created in this period.  Over time, involuntary temporary 
work has become more important (Stone 2013b). Recent data suggest that over 
60 per cent of temporary workers in the EU have this status not by choice, but 
because they could not find permanent employment, with highest proportions of 
involuntary temporary work in the 15-24 age group (Schmid, 2010).  In Spain, 
over 80 per cent of new hires in the last decade have been in the form of 
temporary contracts, with Slovenia, Portugal, Poland, Sweden, France, 
Germany, Finland, Netherlands and Italy presenting similar trends.  It is only in 
Scandinavia and the UK that substantial numbers of temporary workers report 
that they do not want a permanent contract. This is consistent with studies that 
have noted that despite widespread use of temporary contracts for low skilled 
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jobs, in certain countries it is common to see fixed term contracts for managers 
and other high-skilled professionals, and that where this is the case they offer a 
significant pay premium over permanent or open-ended contracts.  
 
It is not clear from the evidence that fixed-term work (that is, temporary work 
not contracted through an agency) plays a counter-cyclical role, absorbing 
labour in a downturn. While such workers were the first to be laid off in 
southern European states most affected by the earlier phases of the financial 
crisis after 2008, this form of employment revived as the effects of the crisis 
abated, implying pro-cyclical effects (Leschke, 2012).  Studies on whether such 
contracts can act as a stepping-stone into permanent work are ambivalent, with 
significant cross-country differences and variations by reference to gender, 
education levels and age (Casale and Perulli, 2013; Kierkegaard, 2014).  In 
Germany, which along with the UK has had a relatively high level of movement 
from fixed-term work into permanent employment, transitions have 
nevertheless declined since the 1990s (Eichhort and Tobst, 2014; Casale and 
Perulli, 2013). There has been a general fall in transitions since 2008, with the 
chances of finding permanent work below 50 per cent in several countries 
(Casale and Perulli, 2013). 
 
It is possible that fixed-term work may act as a low-cost alternative to the SER, 
that is, as a ‘buffer’ which facilitates external or numerical flexibility. Thus 
there is some evidence that such contracts are used to avoid dismissal costs in 
countries with stricter employment protection laws (‘EPL’).  However, looser 
EPL is not consistently correlated with more frequent or effective transitions 
into permanent work (Gash, 2008; Koster and Fleischmann, 2012).  Transition 
rates are low in southern European economies with high levels of EPL but other 
factors are at play here including social norms underpinning the male 
breadwinner model and the weakness of active labour market policy measures.  
Concern over dualisation and segmentation associated with fixed-term work is 
only in part related to the high levels of employment protection enjoyed by the 
core workforce; it is also the result of a legal strategy of exempting fixed-term 
contracts from protections applying to indeterminate employment, which has 
come to be seen as counter-productive in the sense of reinforcing dualisation of 
the labour force (Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and Postal Vinay, 2002; 
Garcia-Serrano and Malo, 2013). 
 
There is some evidence that fixed-term contracts act as a screening device for 
permanent employment. From this perspective fixed-term contracts perform an 
important role in job matching, and are therefore complementary to the SER, in 
the sense of facilitating access to, rather than substituting for, the indeterminate 
employment relationships.  Where legally mandated probation periods are 
shorter than the length of time it takes to assess a worker’s ‘match’ with a job, it 
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is possible that employers may be using fixed-term contracts to achieve an 
extended probationary period during which standard employment protections 
are less extensive (Faccini, 2014).   
 
3.3 Agency work 
 
Agency working, having previously been outlawed or strictly controlled in most 
EU member states, was well established by the early 2000s, and its development 
has been further encouraged by the Temporary Agency Work Directive of 2010 
,which requires a certain degree of liberalisation of the rules around the 
operation of temporary employment agencies.  The formal guarantee of equal 
treatment contained in the Directive, which was in any case subject to a number 
of exceptions, is often denied in practice by the complexity of contractual 
arrangements and the tendency to link employment benefits with seniority.  
Consequently, agency workers are rarely in positions as advantageous as 
comparable permanent employees, and employers have a cost advantage in 
employing them even after taking agency fees into account.  
 
There is a strong gender dimension to agency work, although specific gender 
distributions are affected by occupational segregation. Where agency work 
dominates public/private services and retail, women are over-represented. In 
contrast, in countries where agency work dominates the industrial and 
manufacturing sectors, it is associated with male labour market participation 
(Berkhaut, 2013; Voss et al., 2013). However, women are becoming 
increasingly over-represented in agency work where it is associated with 
‘marketised’ domestic work in the care and service sectors. The gendered 
division of household labour has thus become reflected in the labour market, 
reinforcing the tendency for lower wages to be associated with occupations 
traditionally performed by women in the home (Vosko, 2010).   
 
Studies on temporary agency work show that these contracts can sometimes be 
important in facilitating the transition from unemployment into waged work in 
the case of specifically targeted groups. Nonetheless, the specific effect of 
agency work is more pronounced in relation to those with fewer formal skills or 
qualifications. The evidence that agency work can facilitate transitions from 
unemployment to permanent employment is more ambiguous. Targeted groups 
in particular appear to find it difficult to move from agency work into more 
stable employment, so that agency work often constitutes a dead end (Voss et 
al., 2013). Few studies look at rates of ‘non-transition’ or stagnation, thus giving 
a misleading picture of the effect of temporary and agency contracts. Where 
temporary agency contracts operate as a ‘dead end’, their use can exacerbate 
inequalities, with recent labour market entrants, women and young people 
facing limited prospects of career progression (Casale and Perulli, 2013).   
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4. Shifts in the gendered nature of the SER 
 
To the extent that the SER assumed a specific role for men as the breadwinner, 
and women as the primary performers of household labour, it has been 
associated with the persistence of gender inequalities in the labour market and at 
home. Even at its height in the middle decades of the twentieth century, the 
incidence and nature of the male-breadwinner model varied across countries, 
and while its effects have been attenuated in most contexts, this process has not 
been uniform. Broadly speaking, the southern European states, particularly 
Spain and Italy, continue to adhere strongly to this model; female labour market 
participation remains low and this is particularly so in the years following 
childbirth. This trend is accompanied by a strongly gendered conception of 
social roles which affects the timing of significant life course events and their 
consequences for labour market participation (Anxo et al., 2011). In liberal 
welfare states, a higher level of female participation in paid work is nevertheless 
accompanied by a passive state policy towards gender roles. Full labour market 
participation is encouraged through work incentives and the operation of the tax 
benefit system, but public policy does not actively promote or assist a more 
equal household division of labour of the kind which would allow for parity of 
access to secure jobs.  Social democratic systems, and to some extent post-
communist countries, more clearly promote a dual breadwinner model, so that 
in these countries female employment tends to be full-time and there is a greater 
alignment of male and female household roles, but here too there are limits to 
the equalisation or interchangeability of gender roles.  
 
Across all systems, as the level of female participation in the labour market has 
increased, unpaid female working time, that is, female household labour, has 
fallen, while the duration of unpaid male work has increased. However, this 
trend has now stalled, with studies showing that women continue to perform 
most unpaid labour in the home even in social democratic regimes (Crompton et 
al., 2005). The reduction in female unpaid working time is largely attributable 
to changing norms around housework, together with developments in 
convenience foods and technologies which have reduced the level of time 
consumed in routine domestic tasks, rather than to policy or legal change. The 
increase in male unpaid labour has been partial and selective, and continues to 
track patriarchal norms.  Thus when unpaid male labour is broken down into 
routine, non-routine and childcare aspects, increases are attributable to greater 
performance of non-routine domestic work such as DIY and gardening which 
fits more squarely with traditional gender norms (Kan et al., 2011). Similarly, 
increased participation in childcare by men is not mirrored by an increase in 
male participation in routine housework, so that prevailing attitudes towards 
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‘fatherhood’ continue to play a role in determining the nature of male domestic 
working time (Kitterød
 
 and Pettersen, 2006)  
 
Moreover, there is no clear evidence that increases in unpaid male labour 
correlate with increases in the paid working time of women.  On the other hand, 
women do not decrease their unpaid working time in proportion to increases in 
their paid working hours. The result of this is a new, gendered, division of 
leisure time (Anxo et al., 2011).  Where women have been able to reduce their 
hours of unpaid work this is largely as a result of public childcare provision. 
This helps to explain why countries such as Norway, Denmark and Sweden, 
with widespread and generous public childcare provision, have seen a more 
substantial reduction in unpaid domestic work by women than other systems. 
This development is related to a higher overall level of female full time 
employment (Steiber and Haas, 2012).  
 
There is a clear association between participation in non-standard work and 
longer overall working time, taking unpaid household labour into account 
(Craig and Powell, 2011). This trend however, appears to impact unequally 
across genders. Where men work nonstandard hours, there is a tendency for 
women to adjust their working routines to accommodate this, and thereby to 
increase their unpaid labour. Where women work nonstandard working hours, 
on the other hand, there is a more limited impact on men’s unpaid work. This is 
especially the case in societies which tolerate or encourage a long-hours culture 
for traditionally ‘male’ full-time jobs.  In contrast to the male experience, 
nonstandard hours for women act as a mechanism to enable women to ‘fit’ work 
around their household duties (Kitterød and Pettersen, 2006).  Consequently, 
while nonstandard working arrangements facilitate labour market participation 
by women, they may also act to intensify the sex-based segregation of 
household labour, together with occupational segregation in the labour market. 
Occupational segregation in the labour market continues to be one of the prime 
sources of gender inequality because it enables ‘formal equality’ (often a result 
of  a first wave of equal pay and sex discrimination legislation) to be obscured 
by the systematic undervaluing of certain skills and professions. This may be 
the combined result of gendered conceptions of ‘women’s work’ and of the 
female dominance of professions which are by their nature more 
accommodating of responsibilities outside work.  
 
This gendered division of household labour appears to persist regardless of 
regime type.  Social democratic states are closest to establishing a dual 
breadwinner model.   Women in Scandinavian countries have achieved high 
levels of full-time work.  This is the result of generous public childcare, 
progressive gender ideologies reflected in public policy, and the decoupling of 
taxation and benefits from employment status.   However, egalitarian values and 
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specifically tailored benefits and services, while positively affecting labour 
market participation by women, have a limited impact on the domestic division 
of labour.  Thus the unequal division of labour exists even in the social 
democratic and post-communist states where female labour market participation 
is high and gender equality is an embedded feature of public policy (Crompton, 
Brockmann and Lyonette, 2005). Evidence from Nordic systems also suggests 
that women continue to suffer discrimination in the labour market through 
informal practices which are not well captured by macro-level data (Korvajärvi, 
2014).   
 
In the southern European states, women face greater structural obstacles in 
balancing paid work with the social norms derived from a strong conception of 
‘motherhood’.  In Italy and Spain there are few policies which actively promote 
gender equality or facilitate the balancing of family responsibilities with paid 
work. From a comparative perspective, the result of this is that whereas in social 
democratic, corporatist and liberal welfare state regimes women tend to reduce 
their hours of paid working time to accommodate parenthood, in the southern 
European states they are more likely to withdraw from the labour market 
completely (Anxo 2011). In these countries women find it difficult to access the 
‘good jobs’ associated with the SER on their return to work. The lack of part-
time work further limits women’s choices. The consequence is that the gendered 
segregation of occupations is reinforced.  
 
In conservative and corporatist welfare states which maintain a strong version 
of the male breadwinner norm thanks to its association with the contributory 
principle in social insurance, nonstandard work enables women to reconcile the 
demands competing demands of domestic and paid labour. Where women are 
unable to return to permanent work after having a child, non-standard contracts 
may be the only route back into employment. These contracts are, however, 
associated with lower pay, low-skill, and greater volatility, and their 
concentration in particular segments reinforces the idea that ‘female 
occupations’ do not attract a living wage. Thus the gendered division of 
domestic labour and occupational stratification are mutually reinforcing 
(Schmid, 2010),  
 
Specific policy initiatives which have attempted to improve female labour 
market participation in social democratic and corporatist welfare states have 
sometimes ended up reinforcing gender divisions in new forms.  Thus policies 
aimed at equalising access to higher education and employment have focused 
on making education and work attractive to women. This has been achieved by 
the active promotion of the humanities at the expense of maths and technology, 
and by the introduction of new subjects, home economics and domestic science, 
that have given rise to a gendered skill bias in the labour market.  This has then 
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translated into an over representation of women in the service sector, which has 
served to confirm and reproduce gendered norms, and maintain occupational 
segregation (Charles, 2011).   
 
As mentioned above, the problem of occupational segregation continues to have 
a significant impact on reinforcing gendered divisions in all systems.  Even in 
the Nordic states, ‘female’ and ‘male’ jobs are associated with distinct 
workplace cultures (Kitterød and Rønsen, 2012).  Employment in the public 
sector, particularly in education and healthcare, tends to entail more flexible and 
shorter working hours.  In contrast, male-dominated occupations in the private 
sector, such as finance and manufacturing, have become associated with 
inflexible, intensive working hours arrangements, in particular in liberal welfare 
states which lack effective working time controls for full-time employment. 
This re-embedding of occupational segregation reinforces gender roles in the 
household: couples are unable to adjust their division of labour not only because 
of social norms but because of institutional constraints on male working time. 
Thus, it is clear that the SER is one of a number of factors that continue to 
contribute to gender inequalities in society. But to overcome these issues there 
are a number of barriers, unrelated to the SER, that need to be addressed..   
 
5. Reversing the trend  
 
The rise of non-standard work is not entirely driven by social and technological 
factors external to the legal system; to a certain extent it is a response to 
developments within the law and the wider framework of labour market 
regulation.  Thus the tendency for the legal system to define the SER as the 
focal point for social insurance and employment protection creates pressure for 
the law to recognise, in turn, the distinct features of forms of which do not 
correspond to this model (Rogowski, 2013). The stricter the degree of 
protection for core workers, the more likely it is that part-time work, fixed-term 
employment and agency work will come to be acknowledged as categories in 
their own right and regulated as such (Schömann, Rogowski and Kruppe, 1998).   
Legal analysis of non-standard work began in the early 1980s by recognising 
that employment protection rules implicitly excluded certain forms of 
employment, such as part-time work, from the scope of regulation.  From 
around this time the first laws were passed in mainland European countries 
mandating a degree of equal treatment for atypical workers by reference to 
those in standard employment.   In due course this distinct form of legal 
recognition for non-standard work was reflected in international labour 
standards, including the European Directives governing part-time work (1997), 
fixed-term employment (1999) and agency work (2010).   
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Since that time, it is possible to identify three types of institutional strategies 
(which may overlap in the context of particular laws or measures) that have 
been adopted as ways of addressing the rise of precarious work and its link to 
inequality and segmentation in labour markets (Deakin, 2013, 2014a; De 
Stefano, 2014.  The first is to extend the coverage of the contract of 
employment or other legal form of the SER so that it embraces more of the non-
standard forms; the second is to align the rules governing the SER with those 
applying to non-standard work; and the third is to use complementary 
mechanisms, including collective bargaining and active labour market policy, to 
normalise and regulate non-standard work.  These strategies all involve some 
degree of liberalisation or deregulation of the core of labour law rules applying 
to the SER, but in each case deregulation is best understood as ‘the regulation of 
self-regulation’ (Rogowski, 2013), that is, as a ‘reflexive’ mechanism for 
devolving rule-making power within a polycentric organisation of governance 
arrangements, rather than signifying a simple return to private law. 
 
5.1 Extending the scope of the SER 
 
The legal tests for identifying ‘dependent’ or ‘subordinate’ working 
relationships, which are the focus of protective legislation, are sufficiently 
flexible in all systems to encompass employment forms which depart from the 
traditional model of industrial labour in a single physical site organised along 
hierarchical or bureaucratic lines.  Thus in English law the test of ‘personal’ 
subordination long ago – in the 1950s – evolved to the point of accepting that 
professionals and managers whose working processes are characterised by a 
high level of autonomy can be classed as employees (Deakin, 1998).  Casual 
and intermittent work poses a distinct set of problems.  Employment protection 
laws presuppose a certain level of regularity of work in order for notions of job 
and income security to be operationalised.  Thus the passage of unfair dismissal 
laws tends to induce within a short space of time a legal debate about the 
application of employment protection standards to casual employment forms, 
which runs the risk of creating a type of legally induced dualism or 
segmentation in the labour market (Rogowski, 2013).   
 
Legal systems have responded in various ways to this risk.  One route is to 
adopt looser criteria for identifying subordination, so as to bring within the 
scope of protection relationships characterised by a high degree of economic, as 
opposed to personal, dependence. This is characteristic of the French approach 
to defining the ‘salaried’ status associated with the contract of employment 
(contrat de travail) and which is the gateway to most employment rights.  The 
French courts have taken an expansive and purposive approach to the issue of 
the personal scope of protective legislation since the 1980s, and this process has 
been aided by statutory reforms which shift the burden of proof on to the 
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employer in the ‘grey zone’ between the categories of employee and self-
employed (Freedland and Kountouris, 2011). This strategy has maintained a 
degree of legal coherence in the application of protective labour standards but 
has led to concerns that freelance and other independent workers are being 
misclassified and to extensive litigation on this point.   
 
A different model operates in those systems which have developed new 
definitional categories, beyond the traditional ‘employee’, to which only certain 
core social rights apply. The logic of this approach is that norms which do not 
require a stable employment relationship, such as the right to the minimum 
wage, where this is described in terms of an hourly rate of pay, or the right not 
to be discriminated against in employment or at the point of recruitment, can be 
applied to certain ‘quasi-dependent’ workers, leaving employment protection 
rights exclusively to the domain of the ‘employee’.  In Britain this takes the 
form of the non-employee ‘worker’ category (Burchell, Deakin and Honey, 
1999), in Spain the ‘autonomously economically dependent worker’ and in Italy 
the concept of ‘parasubordination’ (Freedland and Kountouris, 2011).  
 
The problem with this approach is that achieves a degree of integration for those 
in non-standard work, but runs the risk of creating new forms of dualism and 
division, with the boundary between protected and unprotected forms of work 
reappearing in a new form.  In Italy this has recently led to a reappraisal of the 
category of ‘parasubordinate’ workers and a renewed emphasis on the standard 
contract of employment as the juridical basis of protective labour law 
(Freedland and Kountouris, 2011).  In Britain the operation of the ‘worker’ 
concept has not been consistently successful in bringing casual and intermittent 
work within the scope of minimum wage and working time protection, in part 
because more traditional legal tests have reappeared in a modified form, and 
courts have taken a formalistic approach to interpretation which has allowed 
employers to use contractual boilerplate to deflect the application of protective 
labour standards (Deakin, 2003).  Coupled with the absence of a general labour 
inspectorate in Britain, this haphazard approach to the enforcement of labour 
law is in part responsible for the failure of legislation to protect workers in 
casualised and low-paying occupations (Pollert, 2005). 
 
A related legal technique is to reallocate contractual arrangements which 
contain one or more nonstandard elements to a juridical category associated 
with the SER. Thus the ending of a fixed-term contract of employment, which 
in private law terms would normally be described as a consensual act, can be 
characterised in labour law as a dismissal effected by the employer’s failure to 
renew the contract in the same terms (Koukiadaki, 2009).  Similarly, a 
temporary contract can be deemed to be open-ended or indeterminate, after a 
certain passage of time has elapsed. These are techniques first developed at 
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country level and later incorporated into the Fixed Term Employment Directive.   
Similarly, a temporary agency contract is a complex multi-party arrangement 
which, from an analytical perspective, does not resemble a standard contract 
between an employee and single, clearly defined employer. However, juridical 
techniques have been developed for allocating the ‘risk’ and ‘coordination’ 
functions normally combined in the legal person of the single employer to the 
agency and hirer of work respectively.  A related technique is to assign liability 
to multiple employers in a vertical chain of supply, in order to mitigate the cost 
advantages employers may gain from outsourcing or subcontracting (Deakin, 
2003).  In these instances, the legal form of the SER is not in itself a barrier to 
the extension of core labour law protections to nonstandard forms of work.  
Government policies of promoting labour ‘flexibility’, and employer lobbying 
of the kind which led to the dilution of the Temporary Agency Work Directive 
(Countouris and Horton, 2009), are more plausible explanations for the 
persistence of legal dualism in the treatment of these employment forms. 
 
Institutional inertia may also play a part in the fragmentation of labour law 
protections. Wage and hours thresholds, which exclude part-time and 
intermittent work from certain statutory protections, were in some cases 
removed in the 1990s as a result of the intervention of European court 
judgments and directives, but they remain in place in certain parts of 
employment law.  Thus the main factor excluding very precarious and 
intermittent forms of work, such as zero hours contracts, from legal protection 
in Britain, is not the requirement of employee or worker status as such, but the 
application of statutory rules which treat a break in service as cancelling out 
accrued seniority rights (‘continuity of employment’).  Since there are minimum 
qualifying periods in Britain even for such basic entitlements as the right to a 
written statement of contract terms and conditions, zero hours contract workers 
who are employed for brief spells of time tend to have few social rights even 
when they are classed as employees (Adams and Deakin, 2014a).  
 
The continuation of wage and hours thresholds in social security and tax law 
also reinforces dualism.  This is not an inevitable consequence of using the SER 
as a focal point for protection, but a conscious policy choice driven by 
neoliberal agenda of suppressing real wages and reducing the influence of 
collective bargaining over pay.  Subsidising low paid and casual employment 
through the tax system, or ‘fiscalisation’ (Deakin, 2013a), has been widely used 
in liberal welfare states, in particular the UK and USA, since the 1980s. Tax 
credits are used to reduce employers’ direct labour costs while ensuring that 
households continue to receive a subsistence income where, thanks to 
deregulation of the minimum wage and collective bargaining, there is no longer 
an effective statutory or contractual floor of rights to wages.  Tax subsidies of 
this kind are mostly targeted on to full-time workers as a means of underpinning 
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the household income of the main (generally male) earner, thereby mitigating 
the cost to employers of paying a ‘breadwinner’ wage.  Conversely, secondary 
(generally female) earners may be encouraged to take up low-paid and 
intermittent work below the level of weekly hours or wage thresholds which 
determine liability to pay social security contributions.  Here the absence of 
social security taxation operates as an implicit subsidy to very low paid 
employment.  Thus in both cases it is the preservation of wage and hour 
thresholds as a deliberate policy choice, associated with a neoliberal policy 
agenda, and not an inherent feature of the SER model, which serves to segment 
the labour force. 
 
Although fiscalisation began in liberal welfare states, it is becoming more 
widespread, and was used in Germany to underpin the ‘mini jobs’ experiment of 
the Hartz IV reforms (2004), a regime of ‘sanction and support’ workfare 
policies which brought about significant changes to the social security 
entitlements of the unemployed.   In both Britain and Germany, while fiscal 
mechanisms have been credited with raising the employment rate and with 
facilitating individual transitions from unemployment into waged work, they 
have created new forms of dualism and casualisation.  High marginal tax rates 
associated with moving up the wage scale and beyond the range of subsidised 
employment operate as an ‘income trap’ for workers and households.  At the 
same time, standard employment contracts may be displaced by short-term and 
part-time jobs.  Hence in Germany one effect of the mini-jobs reform has been 
to casualise the terms and conditions of main (mostly male) earners in low 
paying occupations. It has had limited success in improving employment 
transitions for the unemployed (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2005; Bosch and 
Weinkopf, 2008; Caliendro and Wrohlich, 2010). 
 
5.2 Equalising the SER and non-standard work 
 
A second and analytically distinct technique is to accept the legitimacy of non-
standard and precarious forms of work, and their distinct legal status, separate 
from the SER, while mandating a limited right to equality of treatment for non-
standard workers.  Since the SER is used as a benchmark these laws are, 
paradoxically, ‘SER-centric’, so that in the process of recognising nonstandard 
employment they are also reinforcing the role of the SER as a focal point of 
labour regulation (Vosko, 2010).  
 
The three EU directives on non-standard work provide the principal illustration 
of this approach, building on earlier national models.  In each case the directive 
calls on member states to remove constraints on the take-up of non-standard 
work, such as the formal restrictions on the use of temporary agency work 
which operated in southern European and, to a lesser extent, ‘corporatist’ 
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systems up to the 1990s.  This liberalisation or removal of such laws, with its 
de-privileging of the SER, is coupled with a qualified right to equal treatment.  
The entitlement is in each case qualified since it stops short of a right to transfer 
from nonstandard work into the SER, although the right to transition in the other 
direction, from the SER to, for example, part-time work, receives clearer legal 
support. 
 
The inclusion of the right to equal treatment in the directives, notwithstanding 
its limitations, was an important step in a shift of attitudes to non-standard 
work.  Up to the mid-1990s, member states, particularly in southern Europe, 
were actively creating exceptions to the SER, in particular through the use of 
derogations for various types of fixed-term employment, which were explicitly 
designed to create an under-protected category of work contracts, which would 
encourage hiring by employers.  In the course of the 2000s this trend was 
reassessed, on the grounds that under-protected forms of fixed term 
employment contribute to dualism, without bringing significant cost advantages 
to employers (Garcia-Serrano and Malo, 2013).  Over-use of fixed term and 
temporary agency work is correlated with reduced productivity and innovation 
at firm level (Zhou, Decker and Kleinknecht, 2011).  
 
Using the equalisation method to address the risk of segmentation has its limits, 
however.  It can cut both ways: raising the condition of nonstandard workers is 
one option, but reducing the level of protection associated with the SER is 
another.  In liberal welfare states where the SER is not as strongly entrenched 
through law, it is a more straightforward matter to align unfair dismissal and 
redundancy protections for fixed-term contract workers and those with 
indeterminate employment contracts.  Thus the British implementation of the 
Fixed Term Employment Directive was relatively unproblematic. The outcome 
is, however, that while fixed-term contract workers now enjoy broadly similar 
protection to those employed indefinitely (Koukiadaki, 2009, neither group 
enjoys the level of security of tenure which is characteristic of core employees 
in continental systems. 
 
More recently, dualism in employment law has had a policy revival in the 
context of the conditions imposed on EU member states in the south of Europe 
affected by the eurozone crisis, in return for financial assistance.  Loosening 
protections for part-time work, fixed-term employment and agency work has 
been a consistent feature of the memoranda of understanding agreed between 
member states and the Troika of the IMF, European Commission and European 
Central Bank (Koukiadaki and Kretsos, 2012).  The policy logic of this position 
is hard to discern in the light of the equivocal evidence on transitions from 
nonstandard work into regular employment and the threat of labour market 
segmentation deriving from such measures; it may reflect little more than 
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institutional rigidities associated with the defective design of European 
economic and monetary union and the persistence of a long-standing IMF 
policy of tying debt relief to ‘structural reforms’ (Adams and Deakin, 2014b; 
Greer, 2014). 
 
5.3 Complementary mechanisms for mitigating dualism: social dialogue, 
corporate governance, active labour market policy and work-life balance 
laws 
 
The most successful strategies for addressing segmentation are those which take 
an integrated policy approach and use a series of linked regulatory mechanisms 
to normalise non-standard work.  The literature on transitional labour markets 
(TLM) has advocated this approach since the mid-1990s (Schmid, 1994; 
Rogowski and Schmid, 1998) and in so far as the EU’s support for a 
‘flexicurity’ model of labour market regulation (Commission, 2006) has an 
empirical foundation it rests on evidence that this type of policy coordination 
can achieve successful outcomes (Schmid and Gazier, 2002).  Although the 
flexicurity approach is open to criticism as drawing unduly generalised 
conclusions from the successes of countries whose experience may not be 
typical, there is scope for experimentation around this model and evidence that 
it can be translated across different regime types (Rogowski, 2013).  
Notwithstanding the role of interest groups in resisting institutional change 
(Thelen, 2012), it is too soon to write off the possibilities of transnational policy 
learning 
 
The case of the Netherlands highlights the role that a conscious policy switch 
can play in altering the profile of nonstandard work and its relationship to the 
SER.  In the 1980s, growth in part-time work and agency work was associated 
with firms seeking to avoid the consequences of the strict law on redundancies 
which required administrative permission to be obtained before an economic 
dismissal could be legally valid.  In the 1990s the law requiring administrative 
approval for redundancies was repealed while, at the same time, hours and wage 
thresholds affecting part-time work were abolished, and social dialogue over the 
use of nonstandard forms of work was promoted by government.  A right to 
flexible work was introduced which went further than the provisions of the EU 
directive in providing for transitions from part-time work to the SER, and not 
just in the other direction. These reforms are seen as regularising part-time work 
but at the same time reducing its status as a secondary form of labour market 
participation (Visser and Hermerijk, 1997; Auer and Gazier, 2002). 
 
Work-life balance laws have played a significant role in normalising non-
standard work.  Enabling workers to balance family responsibilities with work 
should mean that the pressure to accept lower quality jobs due to a need for 
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flexibility in working time arrangements is reduced.  In Denmark, paid leave 
laws have been used to encourage a more equal division of labour in the 
household and also to facilitate transitions, from full-time employment to 
unpaid family work on the one hand, and from unemployment into waged work 
on the other.  These measures covered a wide range of family situations and life 
course choices including child-care, educational leave and sabbaticals.  The 
laws underpinning them provide for modification and implementation of 
schemes through workplace negotiation.  A further feature of these schemes is 
the use of temporary leave schemes to provide placements into waged work for 
the unemployed (Pfau-Effinger, 1998).  
 
Work-sharing arrangements involving novel corporate governance structures 
are a related feature of integrated strategies. In France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands these take the forms of innovative types of social enterprise which 
organise labour pools for workers alongside an element of mutual insurance. 
They differ from for-profit employment agencies or businesses in providing for 
income sharing and risk pooling between workers who are the residual owners 
of the enterprise  They operate by allocating workers to a network of users and 
clients often in a particular region or industrial sector, and also provide training 
and occupational development services (Rogowski, 2013). 
 
The linking of active labour market policy to vocational training laws and active 
labour market policy is a further feature of recent policy innovations. In 
Germany, reform of vocational training has been accompanied by the use of tax 
credits and social insurance system to finance lifelong learning and continuous 
retraining.  In Germany and the Netherlands policy learning has been assisted 
by the involvement of the social partners in the administration of training and 
active labour market policy interventions alongside negotiations over the use of 
nonstandard work (Visser and Hemerijk, 1997). 
 
In each of these cases, the strategy of defending the SER against possible 
substitution effects deriving from the growth of non-standard work has given 
way to a strategy of accepting a more diverse range of employment forms while 
using a variety of mechanisms to regulate and normalise them.  There has been 
some deregulation of employment protection laws, but where this has occurred 
statutory regulation has been replaced by social dialogue and targeted 
interventions of active labour market policy and the tax-benefit system, and not 
by a straightforward return to private law.  Although the absence of a legal right 
to job security in some of the Nordic systems has been cited as a reason for their 
success in balancing employment with social cohesion (Commission, 2006), 
this is an over-formal interpretation of the role of EPL. Thus in Denmark, 
although there is an absence of statutory dismissal protection along the lines 
found in most other EU countries, a functional equivalent exists in the form of a 
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national collective agreement which imposes strong de facto constraints on 
employment terminations, while  multi-employer collective bargaining sets a 
strong de facto wage floor (McLaughlin, 2009).  Other Nordic systems have 
statutory unfair dismissal regimes which do not appear to be below the EU 
average in terms of strictness (Deakin, Malmberg and Sarkar, 2014).  There 
seems to be no basis for concluding from the northern European experience that 
employment transitions are most effectively managed in the absence of job 
security norms of the kind associated with the SER. 
 
More generally, the lesson to draw from policy experimentation within 
European countries is that reform strategies need to move away from a focus on 
the supposedly dualistic effects of EPL.  The assumption behind ‘single 
employment contract’ initiatives in Italy (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002; Casale and 
Perulli, 2013) and France (Cahuc and Kramarz, 2004) is that legal 
classifications associated with EPL are the principal cause of labour market 
segmentation.  But many of the legal categorisations currently found in 
European systems simply reflect factors endogenous to the operation of the 
labour market, in particular employer strategies (Deakin, 2013b; De Stefano, 
2014).  ‘Single contract’ initiatives mostly entail simple deregulation of the 
unfair dismissal rules affecting the SER, making the conditions of core workers 
much less secure, with no compensating benefits for those in temporary work 
(De Stefano, 2014).  Although all reforms encounter problems of translating 
policy into practice and resistance from entrenched interests (Thelen, 2012), the 
most successful appear to be those which couple some liberalisation of EPL 
with an extension of alternative regulatory mechanisms, including collective 
bargaining, in an attempt limit the effects of insecurity on all work categories 
(Voss et al., 2013; Rogowski, 2013). 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Are the decline of the standard employment relationship (‘SER’) and its 
displacement by precarious work inevitable features of industrial capitalism?  
This seems unlikely.  There have been extended periods in the recent past when 
employment was becoming more stable and inequalities in earnings and life 
experiences were being reduced.  Nor is there any reason to believe in a 
structural force within capitalism which prevents labour market regulation from 
operating.  The historical evidence is entirely otherwise: a legal system is 
needed to make the labour market work, and the techniques used to actualise 
this process, encapsulated in the discipline and methodology of labour law, 
involve a role for fairness norms as well as mechanisms for coordination of 
exchange.   
 
27 
 
The loss of the original conditions associated with the emergence of SER, 
which included the rise of vertically integrated enterprise and the associated 
emergence of industrial unionism in the last decades of the nineteenth century 
and the early ones of the twentieth, have undoubtedly undermined its 
effectiveness as a focal point for labour market regulation.  To assume, 
however, that the SER is in irreversible decline, is to neglect the possibility of 
its adjustment to changing conditions.  Furthermore, it is to ignore the fact that 
increases in non-standard work, and the recognition of non-standard 
employment forms as distinct legal categories, often end up reinforcing the 
SER. The link between nonstandard work and precariousness cannot be 
divorced from specific policy decisions that can be reversed, and is not an 
inevitable feature of a labour market in which nonstandard working 
arrangements and the SER can co-exist.  
 
The SER has already evolved to the point where it has lost its historic 
association with factory-based technologies of production.  In the transition 
from state-centred governance to a polycentric regime of transnational labour 
regulation, the SER continues to be a reference point for policy learning and 
innovation in institutional design.  The SER has a complex relationship to 
gender inequality and social stratification.  Although class and gender are no 
longer formal signifiers of protected status as they were in European legal 
systems up the middle decades of the twentieth century, the operation of SER 
continues to reproduce inequalities of various kinds in the organisation of the 
division of labour.  But it is only one of a number of institutions which today act 
as a barrier to addressing these inequalities, and while the search for enduring 
solutions continues, this is nothing new.   
 
Today, the SER is opposed, as in the past, by a millenarian critique of 
capitalism which sees evolved institutions as an impediment to social progress.  
Meanwhile a resurgent neoliberalism seeks to recreate a scaled-down version of 
a market state which never actually existed.  Yet the destructive tendencies of 
global capitalism and the continuous threat of a race to the bottom make the 
traditional functions of the SER, fairness and coordination, more important than 
ever.  The SER offers a contingent and imperfect response to the problems 
posed by industrial society.  The adaptive capacity of the legal system and the 
evolutionary potential of juridical forms associated with the SER suggest, 
however, that it is more likely to be part of the answers to these problems, than 
an obstacle to their resolution. 
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